A response to Papanikitas and Papanikitas; acute ethics: Risk assessment and doctrine of double-effect in a referral to on-call urology  by Hawkey, Mary
lable at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Surgery 7 (2009) 401–402Contents lists avaiInternational Journal of Surgery
journal homepage: www.thei js .comReply
A response to Papanikitas and Papanikitas; acute ethics: Risk assessment
and doctrine of double-effect in a referral to on-call urologyThe Doctrine of Double-Effect (DDE), one closely associated with
Roman Catholic Theology, is held widely but not irrefutably to have
its origins in Thomas Aquinas’s 13th century treatise on self-
defence, Summa Theologica (11–11, Q.64. Art.7)1 Whatever its prov-
enance the doctrine has been reﬁned by scholastic scholars
throughout the intervening centuries, and since the mid-twentieth
century it has been extensively used by the magisterium of the
Catholic Church. It sets out an ethical framework for Catholic health
care workers amongst others, in which moral problems relating to
matters of human reproduction, termination of pregnancy, organ
transplantation and end of life care can be accommodated.
However, its historical origins as a ‘‘tenet of Catholic casuistry’’2
has not precluded it from being applied within secular health
care ethics. As observed by a medical doctor and philosopher, it is
a praiseworthy attempt ‘‘to confront the complexity of moral deci-
sion-making in contexts where intended good effects of actions are
inevitably or probably going to be accompanied by unintended but
foreseeable bad effects ’’.3 Simply stated, DDE claims to answer the
following question: ‘‘Is it right to perform an action fromwhich two
or more effects result, some of which are good and may be rightly
intended and some of which are bad and may not rightly be
intended?’’4 Thus, it emphasises a distinction between the nature
of an act (whether it is intrinsically good or bad), the intention
surrounding an act, and the outcome of the act.
In their very interesting and clinically based discussion Papani-
kitas and Papanikitas5 have delineated and retrospectively applied
the four conditions required by double-effect reasoning to sanction
the morality of a speciﬁc action. Their analysis is directed towards
the ethical dimension of a course of treatment prescribed by an
on-call urology team for an elderly man with advanced dementia
who had developed urinary obstructionwith haematuria. Although
he was otherwise well, his clinical status was further complicated
by warfarin treatment for a prosthetic heart valve.
A feature of DDE reasoning is that it requires an ‘atomistic’
approach to human action, consequently the process of moral deci-
sion-making has to be split into separate parts, consisting of an
evaluation of the ‘action itself’ and the ‘effects of the action’.
‘‘Each part thus analysed out is then assigned a moral qualiﬁer of
‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘indifferent’ ’’.6 In compliance with this requirement
the authors have directed their ethical analysis to the decision to
continue with the patient’s anticoagulation treatment and not toDOI of original article: 10.1016/j.ijsu.2009.04.010.
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doi:10.1016/j.ijsu.2009.05.003recatheterise him should he pull out the catheter (thus they are
defending both an action and an omission to act, the intentions
that accompanied both, and the ensuing outcomes).
My initial response on reading the authors’ analysis was to ask
why such an atomised and complicated framework, one grounded
in ‘‘absolutist theological presuppositions’’,3 was used to address
a moral problem pertaining to a clinically ﬂuid situation. Moreover,
a situation that arguably lent itself as readily, if not more so, to an
approach of ethical scrutiny based on respect for patient autonomy
and the monitoring of risks and beneﬁts integral to the treatment.
In this case, the patient was obviously incapable of expressing his
autonomy, but his humanity had not been lessened. Thus, in my
view, the more interesting ethical question was whether a patient
who was both elderly and demented was treated differently to
a younger and competent patient?
However, I must admit to personal bias in the application of the
principle of double-effect: Although, DDE serves a useful psycho-
logical function in its approach to end of life situations I ﬁnd the
distinction between intention and outcome sometimes morally
ambiguous. In addition, I have a profound distaste for how, in
proscribing direct abortion, DDE directs (Catholic) medical doctors
‘‘to perform procedures that are likely to cause harm to some
women when other procedures are available that that are less
risky’’.4 Consequently, it is not an ethical framework to which I
ﬁnd myself drawn, either intuitively or formally. Furthermore, I
am not medically trained, thus my observations are offered in the
spirit of an interested bystander, but one who is not persuaded
that ‘‘a rule governed approach to morality’’6 best ﬁts the doctor/
patient relationship.
To return to the problem in question. In my view there are
a number of issues that made the application of DDE problematic
in this instance. To begin with, it is questionable as to whether
the surgical team has initiated an act. They may argue that stopping
clexane and restarting warfarin is the ‘good action’, however as
both medications are used to treat thromboembolic disorders, is
this not a matter of clinical rather than moral judgement? Rather,
have they not continued with a course of well-established treat-
ment d albeit with the patient in an altered clinical condition of
which account has to be taken? The situation seems one of clini-
cally ﬁne-tuning, rather than one that requires a response to
a new moral quandary.
With regard to the possibility of the patient presenting with
signiﬁcant bleeding and the risk of re-obstructing; it is difﬁcult to
see how the surgical team can be held morally accountable ford. All rights reserved.
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and the haematuria may be caused by a possible pathology in the
bladder. One can only assume that if obstruction reoccurred that
the patient would not be left in a perilous state.Warfarin is awidely
used drug, andwhile bleeding is a side effect, monitoring for such is
routine practice. With regards tomeeting conditions three and four
of the application of DDE, the account does seem rather muddled
and contrived. As the authors state in respect of condition four:
‘‘Due diligence was taken to monitor and minimise the effects of
bleeding. The decision was not regarded as ﬁnal’’.5 In other words,
the continuous clinical observation that the situation required was
provided, the treatment accordingly adapted and thus the
outcomes could be altered.
There is one further point that I would like to address, one tenta-
tively touched on by Papanikitas and Papanikitas,5 namely how
phrases such as ‘‘the lesser of two evils’’ permeate medical ethics.
In thinking about the ethics of doctors, a concern that they should
avoid evil within ordinary practice seems to be displaced. A discus-
sion of evil cannot be accommodatedwithin this short commentary
piece, but on the simplest of deﬁnitions evil seems to embrace
a lack of empathy and a feeling of malicious intent towards one’s
fellow human beings. Doctors, as do all of us, sometimes decide
or act wrongly, and in their case this may cause harm to patients.
Such harms, I would argue, result from d among other things
dinadequate knowledge, carelessness, avarice or arrogance. Few
doctors, it is to be hoped, deliberately harbour malicious intent
towards their patients. A charge of evil should be properly differen-
tiated from one that maintains harm has been caused.
However, that said, the authors have presented a stimulating
account of theirmoral response to a scenario, whichwith slight var-
iations, is possibly quite commonplace. They have acknowledgedthat their reasoning took place after the event, thus highlighting
how our moral intuitions, devoid of moral rules, are challenged
when confronted with moral theory.7 As they rightly point out,
this aspect of professional morality requires further empirical
exploration.Conﬂict of interest
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